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EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF ANTITRUST LAW:
APPLYING THE SUPREME COURT’S
ANALYSIS IN RJR NABISCO TO
FOREIGN COMPONENT CARTELS
MEGAN L. MASINGILL*
In an increasingly connected global economy, complicated by webs of supply
chains and foreign subsidiaries, the impact of foreign conduct will inevitably
trickle into countries around the globe, including the United States. Often, such
foreign conduct will not abide by the strict laws and regulations enforced by the
United States. In the recent cases surrounding foreign price-fixing cartels for
liquid-crystal-display panels (LCD) panels, a common component in electronics,
the question arose of whether such foreign conduct fell within the scope of U.S.
antitrust law under the Sherman Act. If the extraterritorial arm of the law
extended to allow foreign plaintiffs to bring a claim in these suits, it would leave
the door wide open for the numerous foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent
companies, governed by foreign jurisdictions, to seek redress in the United States.
In 1982, Congress enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
(FTAIA) seeking to ease concerns surfacing in the business community that the
then-current antitrust laws hindered global operations. The purpose of enacting
the legislation was to clarify the broad scope of the prominent antitrust law in
the United States, the Sherman Act. Unfortunately, the FTAIA was ambiguous
and has created even greater confusion among the courts regarding when foreign
conduct is to be governed by U.S. antitrust law. The issue has grown particularly
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unclear in cases involving the activities of foreign component cartels where the
link between foreign subsidiaries and their U.S. parent companies becomes
interrupted by foreign manufacturers and incorporators along the way. As seen
in two factually similar cases, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have provided
inconsistent interpretations of the language of the FTAIA, leaving many
questions unanswered. Though the Supreme Court denied the opportunity to
address the sharp contrast in approaches between the circuits, the Court has not
been entirely silent on the reach of the U.S. laws.
In RJR Nabisco v. European Community, the Court analyzed the
extraterritorial application of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). In its discussion, the Supreme Court analogized to
antitrust law and shed light on its view regarding extraterritorial application
of U.S. laws. This Comment argues that RJR Nabisco is instructive on the
extraterritorial scope of the FTAIA as it pertains to foreign component cartel
activity. Further, the Seventh Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the FTAIA, as
seen in Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics Corp., is most consistent with
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in RJR Nabisco and thus, should provide the
standard in future cases. In applying such a standard, clarity, consistency,
and predictability for these cases can be achieved, allowing companies to make
reasoned decisions about where to do business and avoiding serious judicial
capacity and foreign sovereignty concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider a product owned by ninety-five percent of American adults
today: the cellphone.1 Now consider all the small, technological parts
that go into making that cellphone work. In a globalized market,
where supply chains grow longer and technology capabilities grow
larger, many products, or components of those products, are
manufactured around the globe and all come together through layers
of distribution to create the final product that ends up in the consumer’s
hand.2 As a result, production and sale of many of those components
often do not adhere to the strict regulations of the U.S. antitrust laws.
Some of those parts may have been subject to a foreign cartel’s
anticompetitive conduct, such as price-fixed costs. The anticompetitive

1. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/
fact-sheet/mobile.
2. See Robert Connolly, Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA, CARTEL CAPERS (Sept.
30, 2014), http://cartelcapers.com/blog/motorola-mobility-ftaia (identifying the
concern of the Seventh Circuit with the prevalence of foreign-made components in
products sold in the United States); Skye Gould & Antonio Villas-Boas, Here’s Where All
the Components of Your iPhone Come from, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 12, 2016, 3:54 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/where-iphone-parts-come-from-2016-4 (defining the
most crucial components of the iPhone—LTE modem, storage, camera, display, RAM,
A9 processor, rare minerals, chassis, radio frequency transceiver, Wifi module, battery—
and how many are manufactured in various places including Japan, China, and Taiwan).
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conduct did not occur in the United States, but the cellphone and all its
pieces make its way to the consumer here in the United States. Should
these foreign actions be subject to U.S. antitrust laws?
This question was scrutinized in cases surrounding the recent
conspiracy by foreign manufacturers to price-fix liquid-crystal-display
panels (LCDs) incorporated into cell phones, computers, and
televisions.3 Foreign manufacturers sold LCD panels to foreign
incorporators of the final products, and those incorporators eventually
sold the panels to companies in the United States, including the wellknown company, Motorola Mobility.4 Does U.S. antitrust law allow a
domestic company to bring an antitrust claim against a foreign
conspirator for foreign anticompetitive conduct that affected a
product now being sold in domestic commerce? Such questions
regarding the scope of U.S. antitrust law have created considerable
confusion among the circuit courts.5 This uncertainty stems from courts’
differing interpretations of the application of the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act6 (FTAIA) in the context of foreign component cartel
activity.7 The courts’ conclusions have been “mixed, unclear, and do not
apply a consistent approach” to factually similar issues.8
When the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clear up the
ambiguities surrounding the FTAIA, it denied certiorari, surprising the
legal community and leaving many questions unanswered.9 However,
in a separate decision, the Supreme Court shed light on its current
thinking about the extraterritorial application of federal laws.10 This
Comment argues that the recent decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Community11 and the Supreme Court’s analysis of the
extraterritorial application of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act12 (RICO) are instructive on the extraterritoriality of
the FTAIA. Further, this Comment suggests that the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation of the FTAIA, as it relates to component cartels, is most
3. See Leon Greenfield et al., Foreign Component Cartels and U.S. Antitrust Laws: A
First Principle Approach, 29 ANTITRUST 18, 18 (2015) (describing other recent
component cartel cases that have involved components of automobiles).
4. Id. at 21.
5. See infra Part II.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
7. Greenfield et al., supra note 3, at 18.
8. Id.
9. See infra Section III.A.
10. See infra notes 135–142 and accompanying text.
11. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (plurality opinion).
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012).
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consistent with the Court’s analysis in RJR Nabisco. Though the
precedent does not bind antitrust cases, the Court analogizes to
antitrust law in its decision, expressing a narrowing trend in the
extraterritorial application and general reach of U.S. law.
Part I of this Comment explains the relevant background
information, including a brief overview of the development and
purpose of antitrust law. Part I continues with a discussion of the
history and enactment of the FTAIA in 1982, along with the early
jurisprudence that helped shape the law as it currently stands. Finally,
Part I outlines the issues component cartels present. Part II follows,
providing an overview of the confusions that have emerged among the
courts, particularly between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. Part III
describes the recent developments in the law and how the Supreme
Court’s denial of certiorari in two recent antitrust cases failed to meet
the legal community’s expectations. Further, Part III highlights the
recent case, RJR Nabisco, and the Court’s analysis of the extraterritorial
application of the federal RICO statute. Part IV argues that the Court’s
decision and analysis in RJR Nabisco is instructive on the issue of
extraterritoriality of the FTAIA, as it concerns foreign component
cartels, by drawing an analogy to RICO and looking to the statutory
construction and legislative history of the statute. Part IV then explains
why the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is most analogous the Court’s
reasoning and should provide the standard for future cases of its kind.
Part V takes a brief look at policy considerations that arise in the debate
of whether U.S. laws should apply extraterritorially. Finally, Part VI
considers a simplified scenario presented by a component cartel and
provides a roadmap for how a future court should approach the issue
in light of the RJR Nabisco decision.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development and Purpose of Antitrust Law
In 1890, Congress enacted the Sherman Act laying the groundwork
for antitrust law and what is currently the predominant law protecting
against anticompetitive conduct in the United States.13 The Sherman
Act broadly states that its purpose is “to protect trade and commerce

13. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012); Jeffrey C. Bank & Thua Hong, The
International Comparative Legal Guide to: Competition Litigation 2018: USA, GLOBAL LEGAL
GROUP 273, 273 (10th ed. 2017).
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against unlawful restraints and monopolies.”14 The Sherman Act’s
major focus is competition, as Congress wanted to ensure that
unreasonably restrictive conduct would not impede American
businesses.15 Though Congress’s motivation was to clear the way for
companies, the broad language of the Sherman Act created vast
uncertainty among the courts about precisely which activities were
included within its scope, particularly concerning foreign activity.16
The Sherman Act allows for both criminal and civil actions against
anticompetitive conduct that affects domestic commerce, such as
price-fixing or competition-reducing mergers and monopolization.17
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) jointly enforce antitrust law under the Sherman
Act, protecting the market and consumers against such restrictive and
anticompetitive conduct.18
B. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
After Congress enacted the Sherman Act, courts consistently held
that the foreign activities that arose were within the reach of U.S.
antitrust laws, which aggravated foreign nations and raised
14. H.R. REP. NO. 51-1707, at 1 (1890). See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE
COMM’N, Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation 4 (2017)
[hereinafter DOJ & FTC Antitrust Guidelines] (outlining the antitrust provisions of the
Sherman Act); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (envisioning
the Sherman Act as a “comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving
free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade”).
15. Historically, the Sherman Act was strictly territorial excluding from its reach
any conduct that occurred outside U.S. borders. The Supreme Court in American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909), overruled by W.S. Kirkpatrick &
Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 406–08 (1990), held that conduct
occurring in Central America was outside the scope of the Sherman Act. The Second
Circuit replaced the territorial approach with the “effects” test in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 445 (2d Cir. 1945). Richard W. Beckler
& Matthew H. Kirtland, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law: What is a “Direct,
Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect” Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act?, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 11, 12 (2003).
16. The relevant language of the Sherman Act states in part, “[e]very contract . . .
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1.
17. See DOJ & FTC Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 14, at 4–5.
18. Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 15, at 12. In deciding whether to bring a case,
the agencies’ primary concern is whether “there is a sufficient connection between the
anticompetitive conduct and the United States such that the federal antitrust laws . . .
would redress harm or threatened harm to U.S. commerce and consumers.” DOJ &
FTC Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 14, at 16.
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considerable concerns about the principle of international comity.19
These concerns pushed Congress to impose limitations on the
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act.20 In 1982, Congress enacted
the FTAIA, carving out an exception to the Sherman Act by excluding
from its reach certain “non-import trade” activity.21 The general rule
reflected in the FTAIA is that the Sherman Act will not govern conduct
in foreign trade or commerce, or when the anticompetitive conduct at
issue is foreign.22 The relevant language of the FTAIA states:
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or
commerce . . . with foreign nations unless—
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect—
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with
foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations,
of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United
States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of [the
Sherman Act] other than this section.23

19. See, e.g., David Lord Hacking, The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Laws:
A Cause for Concern Amongst Friends of America, 1 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 2–4 (1979);
James A. Rahl, International Application of American Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals,
2 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 336, 336 (1980) (highlighting complaints from nations with
domestic antitrust laws regarding American competitiveness, following the enactment
of the Sherman Act). Hacking discusses a case involving Swiss watchmakers that
“provides [a] classic illustration of the foreign policy implications of extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws.” Hacking, supra note 19, at 3 (citing United States
v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr., Inc., 25 F.R.D. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)); see also Alcoa,
148 F.2d at 443 (taking the view that states have the ability to hold liable any illegal
conduct that has consequences within the U.S., regardless of where it occurred or who
the actor is); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 593–94
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (extending Sherman Act antitrust application to a British corporation,
holding it liable for conspiracy).
20. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686 (1982) [hereinafter Committee Report]. See generally
John H. Shenefield, Thoughts on Extraterritorial Application of the United States Antitrust
Laws, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 350, 351 (1983).
21. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
22. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158 (2004)
(emphasizing the exclusion of activity without a domestic impact).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
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The ambiguity of the FTAIA has resulted in various interpretations
and conflict amongst lower courts over its precise meaning.24 The
language of the FTAIA is unclear at best, but ultimately the Sherman
Act applies when the alleged anticompetitive conduct falls within
certain parameters.25 As a principal matter, the FTAIA lays out the
“import commerce exclusion” that import activity will be governed
exclusively by the Sherman Act and the FTAIA will not apply.26 For
example, if a foreign manufacturer conspires and sells a price-fixed
product directly to a company in the United States for sale to
consumers, the manufacturer directly imported that product into the
United States and thus, the FTAIA would not apply.27
Once the conduct classifies as non-import—meaning U.S. export or
wholly-foreign commerce—the FTAIA applies, and the conduct is only
brought back within the scope of the Sherman Act if it satisfies the
“effects exception” and that effect “gives rise to a claim.”28 The effects
exception provides for Sherman Act coverage if the effect on U.S.
domestic commerce is “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable.”29 The effects exception determines whether there is
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, whereas the second
requirement determines whether the plaintiff has standing to bring
that particular claim.30 The FTAIA is inapplicable only when the
effects exception is met and such domestic effect “gives rise to a
claim.”31 A court must find both of these exceptions to the prohibition
on extraterritorial application for the non-import conduct to fall back
under the governance of the Sherman Act.32 Precisely what Congress
24. Lauren Giudice, What Effects are “Direct” Enough to Satisfy the FTAIA: An Analysis
of 2014 FTAIA Decisions, B.U. INT’L L.J. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.bu.edu/ilj/
2015/04/29/what-effects-are-direct-enough-to-satisfy-the-ftaia-an-analysis-of-2014-ftaia-decisions.
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (requiring that for conduct to fall back within the Sherman Act’s
governance it must be import activity that has the requisite effect on U.S. commerce, and
such effect must give rise to the plaintiff’s claim); Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 15, at 14.
26. DOJ & FTC Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 14, at 19; see also 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
27. DOJ & FTC Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 14, at 19.
28. Id. at 21. Europe uses a very similar effects test: the application of antitrust
law to conduct that occurs outside of Europe “is justified . . . when that conduct has an
‘immediate, substantial, and foreseeable effect’ in Europe.” Jeffrey S. Jacobovitz,
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: When do U.S. Antitrust Laws Apply to Foreign
Conduct?, STRAFFORD CLE WEBINAR 10 (June 22, 2017) (quoting Case T-286/09, Intel
Corp. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547, ¶¶ 231, 233–36, 243–44 (June 12, 2014)).
29. DOJ & FTC Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 14, at 21. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
30. DOJ & FTC Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 14, at 21. See § 6a.
31. See § 6a(2); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 173 (2004).
32. See § 6a; DOJ & FTC Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 14, at 21.
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meant by the terms “non-import,” “direct, substantial, and
foreseeable,” and “gives rise to” has been contentiously debated.33
1.

Legislative history of the FTAIA
Legislative history provides some insight into the effect that
Congress intended the FTAIA to have, including clarification of the
Sherman Act’s scope.34 The committee report for the enactment of
the FTAIA outlined two primary purposes for the Act: (1) to promote
American exports, and (2) to create one objective test to clear up the
confusion.35 For Congress, the legislation was crucial given the
ambiguity that surfaced in trying to define the language of the
Sherman Act; thus, Congress’s goal was to provide clarification by
creating a “precise legal standard” to determine whether certain
anticompetitive conduct fell within its reach.36
Along with addressing ambiguity, Congress aimed to change a
perception. During the period surrounding the enactment of the FTAIA,
there was a general sense among American businesses that the antitrust
laws, while intended to help, actually hurt their abilities to participate in
export markets.37 Congress wanted to combat this view through the
FTAIA’s language, making it “explicit [that U.S. antitrust laws] appl[y]
only to conduct having a ‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect’ on domestic commerce or domestic exports.”38 Seeking to ensure
businesses would not be excluded from export markets, Congress chose
to narrow the application of antitrust law to conduct negatively affecting
imports, and excluding export activity.39
Further, the discussion preserved in the committee report makes
clear that Congress intended to not only clarify when the Sherman Act
applied to foreign conduct, but to restrain such application.40
Unfortunately, the attempt to resolve the ambiguity was unsuccessful
33. See infra Section I.C.3, infra Part II.
34. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (1982).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 5.
37. See id. at 2 (acknowledging the first purpose of the legislation to change “the
apparent perception among businessmen that American antitrust laws are a barrier to joint
export activities that promote efficiencies in the export of American goods and services”).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 7–8 (quoting Chairman Rodino’s statement that “[t]he specific purpose
of the Sherman Act modification is[] to more clearly establish when antitrust liability
attaches to international business activities[,] . . . establishing restraints on export
trade only violate the Sherman Act if they have a direct and substantial effect”).
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and led to greater discord among the courts.41 Foreign activity and the
complicated considerations related to such activities continues to
create headaches for courts and parties alike. This Comment
addresses those considerations and hones in specifically on
international component cartels and the typical scenario as presented
in price-fixing cases.42
C. Early FTAIA Jurisprudence
The FTAIA’s enactment created numerous problems, but a handful of
cases have made significant developments that have helped to clarify the
law. While many other cases have shaped FTAIA law since its inception,
this Comment discusses the most impactful cases in detail below.43
Indirect purchaser doctrine and Illinois Brick
First, an important concept considered in the discussion of the
FTAIA is the indirect purchaser doctrine initially raised in Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois44 in 1977. The plaintiff’s claim in this case is still a source
of controversy among the circuit courts today.45 The case involved
domestic manufacturers of concrete bricks, which sold the bricks to
contractors, and those contractors in turn submitted bids to general
1.

41. Ellen Meriwether, Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA: If Not Here, Then Where?, 29
ANTITRUST 8, 9 (2015) (describing the negative reception to the text of the Act by the Third
and Ninth Circuits, calling it “inelegantly phrased” and a “web of words,” respectively).
42. See infra Part II.
43. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d Cir. 2014)
(holding that the requirements of the FTAIA are non-jurisdictional and substantive;
therefore, they go to the merits of a claim). The Lotes court relied on a bright-line rule
that a statute is jurisdictional when the legislature clearly states that it is. Id. at 405
(citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 504 (2006)).
44. 431 U.S. 720, 764–65 (1977).
45. See id. at 726–27 (considering whether the doctrine of an indirect purchaser
should apply to the antitrust context at issue and thus be grounds for barring a claim);
see also Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2015)
(blocking the claim because of “its collision with the indirect-purchaser doctrine”
irrespective that some of the increased price was passed on from the direct seller);
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2012) (focusing only on
direct-purchaser claims because, following Illinois Brick, “indirect purchasers are not
entitled to sue for damages under the federal antitrust laws”). But see Lotes, 753 F.3d
at 413 n.7 (acknowledging the doctrine but interpreting the holding in Illinois Brick to
“in no way impl[y] that anticompetitive injuries cannot be passed through to
subsequent purchasers”). See generally Matthew Perlman, States Urge Justices to Flip
Illinois Brick in Apple Case, LAW360 (Oct. 2, 2018, 7:55 PM), https://www.law360.com
/articles/1088314/states-urge-justices-to-flip-illinois-brick-in-apple-case (discussing the
thirty-one states that filed amicus briefs urging the Supreme Court to overturn Illinois Brick).
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contractors, who would ultimately use the bricks on local projects.46
The general contractors brought an antitrust claim against the
manufacturers alleging a conspiracy to fix the price of the bricks,
violating the Sherman Act.47
At the Supreme Court, the Justices’ discussion focused on the
indirect purchaser doctrine, which allows only the direct purchaser to
bring a suit.48 The general contractors were indirect purchasers of the
bricks because the link between the manufacturers and the general
contractors was separated by two levels of distribution.49 The Court
barred the contractors’ claim because it was only the direct purchaser
who was harmed by the overcharged bricks; the harm could not be
passed down the chain of distribution for reasons of duplicative
recovery and economic realities.50 Some courts have discussed
applying the doctrine in foreign component cartel cases involving the
FTAIA, but the government previously contended that there should be
an exception when the FTAIA bars recovery for the first purchaser in
the United States.51 However, the American Bar Association (ABA), in
advising on antitrust guidelines, noted that the government-proposed
exception contradicts longstanding precedent and tradition.52 Thus, how
the doctrine interacts with component cartel cases remains unsettled.

46. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726.
47. Id. at 726–27.
48. Id. at 726.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 729–32, 743 (considering the economic consequences of allowing
offensive, but not defensive, use of the pass-on theory from Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), including the significant risk of
duplicative recovery and inconsistent treatment of cases). The Court also looked at
the practicality of allowing these claims, recognizing that to trace the cost increase
through all levels of distribution would be incredibly complex and expensive because
of the time and evidence it would take. Id. at 758.
51. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, Joint Comments
of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law and Section of International Law on
the Proposed Update to the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust
Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation 8 (2016) [hereinafter Joint
Comments] (citing Kirsten Limarzi, U.S. DOJ, Antitrust Division, Comments at the
American Antitrust Institute’s 10th Annual Private Enforcement Conference (Nov. 9, 2016)).
52. Id.
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International comity and Hartford Fire
In the Supreme Court case Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,53 Justice
Scalia’s dissent provides particular insight into extraterritorial analysis.54
The issue in the case was whether the Sherman Act applied to a conspiracy
by London reinsurance companies on the basis that the conspiracy
affected the U.S. insurance market.55 Defendants argued that the
“principle of international comity” prevented the Court from exercising
jurisdiction because the conduct occurred outside of the United States.56
In his dissent, Justice Scalia discussed the extraterritorial application
of the Sherman Act, highlighting that when determining if a statute
has extraterritorial reach, the Court must look to two canons of
statutory construction.57 The first canon, the “presumption against
extraterritoriality,” reflects the presumption that legislation is only to
apply domestically unless rebutted by a contrary intent.58 Justice Scalia,
however, acknowledged that in some cases, the Sherman Act overcame
this presumption and has been applied extraterritorially.59 In
situations where the presumption is overcome, courts must then look
to the second canon, that, to the extent possible, congressional actions
will not be construed in a way that violates foreign laws.60 This concept
is related to the principle of international comity, a principle
historically used to limit the scope of U.S. law.61 Justice Scalia stated
2.

53. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
54. Id. at 800–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 771–74.
56. Id. at 770.
57. Id. at 814–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 814 (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)); see also Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013) (discussing the presumption
against extraterritoriality in enforcing the Alien Tort Statute to avoid “unwarranted
judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy”); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank
Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (explaining that Congress must provide a clear
indication of extraterritorial application; mere silence on the issue does not give the
court authority to presume Congress’s intention).
59. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 814–15. To emphasize this canon, Justice Scalia referred to then-Judge
Hand’s opinion in Alcoa, in which he stated: “we are not to read general words, such
as those in [the Sherman] Act, without regard to the limitations customarily observed
by nations upon the exercise of their powers.” Id. at 816–17 (quoting United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2nd Cir. 1945)).
61. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004)
(concluding that “principles of prescriptive comity” act as a limit on the reach of U.S.
antitrust law); 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(1)–(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1987) (limiting unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction when
it involves a party or activity that is connected with a foreign State); William S. Dodge,
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that it would be inconceivable to apply our laws to the context in
Hartford Fire and noted that the majority’s “breathtakingly broad
proposition” would force “the Sherman Act . . . into sharp and
unnecessary conflict with the legitimate interests of other countries—
particularly our closest trading partners.”62
3.

The Supreme Court and the “give rise to” requirement
Finally, the most recent FTAIA Supreme Court case, F. HoffmannLaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,63 was an important decision in the
development of the FTAIA. The Court granted certiorari over the
issue—foreign price-fixing causing domestic and foreign injuries—
with the hopes of clearing up the great confusion over the meaning of
the § 6a(2) “give[s] rise to” requirement.64 The context of the case
centered around a price-fixing conspiracy for vitamins in which the
price of vitamins was allegedly increased globally, including in the
United States.65 In its decision, the Court emphasized the limiting nature
of the FTAIA, signaling to U.S. exporters and businesses abroad that the
Sherman Act would not prevent businesses from participating in
anticompetitive conduct so long as the effect was only felt in the foreign
market.66 The Court also pointed to the committee report for the

International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2102–07 (2015) (exploring
the use of international comity in domestic law and as a principle of restraint).
62. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 820. The Supreme Court recently ruled on a pricefixing case involving Chinese manufacturers of Vitamin C, addressing the deference
U.S. courts owe to foreign declarations of their own laws. See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc.
v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018). The Court held, vacating the
Second Circuit’s ruling, that courts are not bound by the foreign statements, only that
“respectful consideration” should be given. Id. at 1869–70; see also Jones Day, The Cost
of Doing Business: Supreme Court Vacates Chinese Defendants’ Antitrust Win, JD SUPRA (June
27, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-cost-of-doing-business-supreme89451 (discussing the implications of the holding, that upholding the lower court’s
decision could have limited the reach of the FTAIA by allowing foreign government
statements to outweigh direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable impacts). The
blog also discussed broader policy implications of the ruling, particularly with foreign
countries like Cuba, which may no longer want to do business knowing that “[t]he cost
of doing business in the United States may . . . be [a] liability.” Id.
63. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
64. See id. at 162.
65. Id. at 159. Foreign vitamin distributors from Ukraine, Australia, Ecuador, and
Panama who purchased price-fixed vitamins tried to get jurisdiction by claiming that
the conspiracy raised prices in the United States and in Ecuador. Id. at 159–60.
66. Id. at 160-61 (discussing how the FTAIA removes conduct from the Sherman’s
Act’s reach unless the criteria are met (citing to H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, 1–3, 9–10 (1982)).
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enactment of the FTAIA as being highly persuasive and stated that “[f]or
those who find legislative history useful, [it] should end the matter.”67
The Court held that the phrase “gives rise to” meant gives rise to “the
plaintiff’s claim,” and not merely “a” claim, meaning that the domestic
effect of the conspiracy must be the cause of the plaintiff’s injury.68 In
making this determination, the Court looked at the purpose, language,
and history of the FTAIA to hold that where the “adverse foreign effect
is independent of any adverse domestic effect,” the exception in the
FTAIA that the effect must give rise to the claim is not met and
therefore the conduct is beyond reach of the Sherman Act.69 The
Court’s reasoning was twofold. First, the statutory construction of the
principle of international comity requires courts to act cautiously and
consider the sovereign interests of foreign nations.70 Second, “the
FTAIA’s language and history suggest that Congress designed the
FTAIA to clarify, perhaps to limit, but not to expand in any significant
way, the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign commerce.”71 The
“gives rise to” issue was hotly debated and, despite the clarity of this
holding, what constitutes the requisite casual connection is still
unsettled.72 However, this decision was one of the most important
developments of the FTAIA because it offered insight into the Justices’
thoughts regarding the application of U.S. antitrust law, just how far it
should reach, and how much conduct the FTAIA excludes.
II. COMPONENT CARTELS: WHAT ARE THEY
AND WHAT IS THE CONFUSION?
International cartels occur when a group of manufacturers conspire
to fix the price of a product and import that product into the United

67. Id. at 163 (adding that legislative history aside, careful consideration of the
FTAIA would lead to the same conclusion that when the anticompetitive conduct is
foreign, the FTAIA applies).
68. Id. at 173–74 (disagreeing with the plaintiff’s claim that the domestic effects
were “harmful enough to give rise to ‘a’ claim,” and that it does not matter that it “is
not their own claim; it is someone else’s claim”).
69. Id. at 164.
70. Id. “This rule of construction reflects principles of customary international
law—law that (we must assume) Congress ordinarily seeks to follow.” Id.
71. Id. at 169.
72. See S. Lynn Diamond, Empagran, The FTAIA and Extraterritorial Effects: Guidance
to Courts Facing Questions of Antitrust Jurisdiction Still Lacking, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 805,
829–30 (2006).
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States and around the globe.73 When a conspirator directly imports
the product into the United States, the actors are subject to U.S.
antitrust law under the Sherman Act because such conduct is classified
as an “import,” and thus is removed from the FTAIA’s control.74
Component cartels are similar in that manufacturers conspire to fix
the price of a product; however, the product is a component that will
go into the manufacture of another final product.75
The
manufacturers sell the component at the illegally fixed price to an
incorporator—likely a foreign company or foreign subsidiary of an
American company—which then sells the finished product to retailers
located, for the purpose of this Comment, in the United States.76
The DOJ and FTC Antitrust Guidelines provide an illustrative
example of this problem:
Corporation 1 and Corporation 2 have factories in Country Alpha
where they manufacture Component X, a piece of high-tech
hardware used in electronic products.
Corporation 1 and
Corporation 2 agree to raise prices for Component X sold to finished
product integrators. These integrators . . . incorporate Component X
into finished electronic products sold in the United States.77

So why is this confusing for courts? With an international
component cartel, the threshold question is whether its activities—and
given that its first sale is to a foreign entity—fall within the import
requirement, and thus determining whether the conduct is governed
73. See Margaret Levenstein et al., International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing
Countries: A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies 1, 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 9511, 2003) (“Producers form a cartel with the goal of limiting
competition. By restricting output and increasing price, ideally to the price a monopolist
would set (if the cartel controls the entire market), profits will be jointly maximized.”).
74. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 817–18 (7th Cir.
2015) (finding that Motorola had a “solid claim” for the one percent of panels bought
and delivered directly to Motorola in the United States); Giudice, supra note 24
(providing examples of direct sales that took place in the LCD panel price-fixing cases,
such as the direct sale of panels from defendants to the company Dell in the U.S.).
75. “Some of the largest cartel investigations and civil suits have targeted foreign
suppliers of components that were incorporated overseas into finished products later
sold in the U.S.” Jacobovitz, supra note 28, at 57.
76. See Jae Hyung Ryu, Comment, Deterring Foreign Component Cartels in the Age of
Globalized Supply Chains, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 81, 82 (2016)
(describing a situation where price-fixed LCDs were sold to U.S. companies at an
increased price, presenting the question of whether the Sherman Act can hold those
conspirators of the component cartel liable).
77. DOJ & FTC Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 14, at 22. Note also that “Illustrative
Example C” is discussed separately from the illustrative example on non-component cartel
cases, suggesting the situations are to be dealt with differently under antitrust law. Id.
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by the Sherman Act or the FTAIA.78 In the case of a domestic plaintiff
purchaser, import commerce is evident because the plaintiff
purchased the component directly from the cartel.79 It is increasingly
less clear, however, when one or more foreign entities, including U.S.
owned foreign subsidiaries, serve as middle men between the cartel
and the U.S. entity.80 Should the foreign entity or the U.S. company
on behalf of its foreign subsidiaries be able to recover for an injury—
the increased price of the component purchased from the
conspirator—suffered outside the United States simply because the
products eventually entered the United States? Lower courts have
failed to provide a consistent answer to this question.81
If the answer is yes and the conduct classifies as import commerce, the
FTAIA does not apply; however, if the conduct is not import commerce
because the conspirator was not the entity to bring the product into the
United States, the FTAIA applies and necessarily begs the question:
What qualifies as a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable”
effect?82 Courts have inconsistently defined what a “direct” effect is,
ranging from the narrow definition of “immediate consequence” to the
broader “reasonably proximate casual nexus” interpretation.83

78. See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text; Motorola, 775 F.3d at 818 (first
considering whether the panels were imported to the United States by the defendants).
79. Meriwether, supra note 41, at 9.
80. Id.
81. See Giudice, supra note 24 (noting that Congress failed to create a clear rule to
analyze foreign anticompetitive conduct, which led to circuit splits).
82. See Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 15, at 15 (recognizing the difficulty that
“[f]or non-import commerce, courts apply the FTAIA’s ‘direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect’ test,” but “determining exactly what constitutes a ‘direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ has created uncertainty”).
83. See Giudice, supra note 24 (discussing the Second and Seventh Circuits’
interpretation of direct to mean a “reasonably proximate causal nexus,” and the Ninth
Circuit’s literal interpretation that “direct” means “immediate consequence”).
According to Illustrative Example C of the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines—in
relation to component cartels—“the anticompetitive cartel agreement could cause the
price in the world market to stabilize or even rise, which also could indirectly affect
U.S. prices[;]” however, this does not necessarily mean that such agreement created
“the ‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ necessary to trigger subject
matter jurisdiction.” See Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 15, at 16. Beckler and Kirtland
provide several examples of conduct that may cause such direct effect: customers paying
higher prices, “artificial inflation of [the price] of a given product,” “artificial limits on
the volume of imported products,” “an artificial reduction in prices of a given product,”
and “artificial limits on the volume of products exported from the U.S.” Id. at 19.
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To add to the confusion, scholars and judges have questioned if and
how the indirect purchaser doctrine applies to antitrust claims.84 This
question is even more prevalent when a component cartel is involved,
because “[n]othing is more common nowadays than for products
imported to the United States to include components that the
producers bought from foreign manufacturers.”85 Given this current
climate, it is less likely that U.S. entities are purchasing components
directly from foreign manufacturers, but rather through a foreign
subsidiary. If this is the case, the indirect purchaser doctrine would
block the parent company in the United States from being able to
bring a claim on behalf of its foreign subsidiary because the two are
considered legally independent entities, and thus the U.S. company is
an indirect purchaser.86 Only a handful of cases have even brought up
the indirect purchaser doctrine, and the government has proposed an
exception.87 Yet, the extent of the doctrine’s applicability, if any, to
antitrust cases involving component cartels remains to be determined.88
Legislative history provides minimal guidance on these issues,
despite the explicit comments on “Imports and Purely Foreign
Transactions” and “International Cartels” in the committee report.89
On international cartels, the committee recognized that because
international cartels often cause global shortages and artificial
inflation, the conduct would likely have the necessary effect on U.S.
commerce, and given this, the committee anticipated the DOJ to

84. See Giudice, supra note 24. In discussing the petition for certiorari in the
Motorola case, Giudice notes that an analysis by the Supreme Court could provide
useful guidance on the Illinois Brick doctrine and help address the split over the
definition of “direct.” Id.
85. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2015).
86. See id. at 823 (explaining that “[a]lthough Motorola, the ‘customer,’ owns its
foreign subsidiaries—the ‘direct purchasers’ of the components—[the foreign
subsidiaries] are incorporated under and regulated by foreign law”).
87. The government in Motorola argued that the “doctrine should be construed to
permit damages claims by the first purchaser affected in U.S. commerce when the
FTAIA bars the direct purchaser’s claims.” Giudice, supra note 24 (citing Brief for the
United States and the FTC as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Motorola
Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 14-8003 (7th Cir. Sept. 5, 2014)).
88. The Motorola court did not opine on whether there should be an exception as
suggested by the government because it “found that Motorola waived the argument
that it could recover for overcharges on the finished product based on price-fixing of
the component.” Id. Since the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on the Motorola
case, this issue has not been discussed.
89. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 9–10, 13–14 (1982).
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continue criminal enforcement against cartel activity.90 Congress
seemed to indicate that in certain circumstances, foreign conduct
would have the requisite effect, and therefore, allow the government
to pursue criminal charges; however, the report reflects no discussion
of when the effect would be sufficient in a private action.91
Additionally, it is apparent from the report that the committee did not
intend for the Sherman Act to reach claims solely because an American
actor was involved.92 This may be an indication of how Congress
anticipated the FTAIA to cover indirect purchasers.
A. Circuit Confusions
Despite several developments since the enactment of the FTAIA, the
issues regarding its application to foreign component cartels, which
limit the extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act, are unresolved.93
Circuits have approached the problem differently and ruled on various
grounds, leading to inconsistent outcomes on what appear to be
factually similar cases.94 One problematic inconsistency arises when a
foreign purchaser alleges an international conspiracy to fix the price
of components, later to be incorporated into final products and
eventually sold in and affecting foreign and domestic markets. This
issue arises because either the foreign purchaser, or parent company
on its behalf, is harmed by the foreign conduct and is trying to bring a
private claim under U.S. antitrust law, or the foreign defendant-

90. Id. at 13.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 9 (explaining legislative intent to exclude transactions between
American-owned foreign firms from U.S. antitrust laws).
93. “For the past several years, plaintiffs and defendants in international pricefixing cases have battled over the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in
light of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 . . . and the U.S.
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A.”
Robert Reznick, Antitrust Implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in RJR Nabisco
v. European Community, ORRICK ANTITRUST WATCH (June 23, 2016),
https://blogs.orrick.com/antitrust/2016/06/23/antitrust-implications-of-the-u-ssupreme-courts-decision-in-rjr-nabisco-v-european-community.
94. See Antitrust Update: Supreme Court Surprises the Antitrust World with Denial of Cert
in Motorola and AU Optronics, PATTERSON BELKNAP (June 15, 2015),
https://www.pbwt.com/antitrust-update-blog/supreme-court-surprises-antitrustworld-denial-cert-motorola-au-optronics [hereinafter Antitrust Update] (discussing the
recent Supreme Court denials despite the acute conflict between the circuits’
interpretations of objectively similar cases).
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conspirator argues against the ability of the U.S. government to pursue
a criminal charge against them under U.S. antitrust law.95
Seventh Circuit and Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics Corp.
It is an economic reality that more frequently than not, a product
being imported into the United States includes components that
foreign manufacturers purchased before they were incorporated into
final products and resold to retailers.96 Against this backdrop, more
situations like the one in Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics Corp.97 arise.
The case was part of a series of cases alleging that Taiwanese and
Korean manufacturers were involved in a large international
conspiracy to fix the price of LCD panels in violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act.98 Motorola, a U.S. company, and ten of its foreign
subsidiaries bought LCD panels from the defendant, AU Optronics, to
incorporate into cellphones.99 Not at issue was the one percent of
panels the manufacturers sold directly to Motorola in the United States
because this portion of panels fell clearly within the classification of
“import commerce.”100 Of the other ninety-nine percent of panels
AU Optronics produced, only forty-two percent were purchased by
Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries, incorporated into cellphones, then
sold and shipped to Motorola for resale in the United States.101
The issues discussed in the case were whether the conduct classified as
“import commerce”; whether plaintiffs alleged an antitrust violation
under the FTAIA; and whether Motorola, on behalf of its foreign
subsidiaries, had antitrust standing to bring the claim.102 In addition to
1.

95. See discussion infra Section II.A.1, II.A.2.
96. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2015).
See Connolly, supra note 2 (explaining that it could be near inconceivable to name a
product sold in the United States that does not include some component made abroad).
97. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 816.
98. Id. at 817; Meriwether, supra note 41, at 8. LCD panels are an expensive
component part incorporated into many modern technologies, such as computers,
TVs, and phones, costing up to ten percent of the cost of the final product for a phone,
but up to seventy percent for TVs. Id. at 10.
99. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 817.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 818.
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opining on these issues, the court also discussed concerns of international
comity and made a distinction between criminal and private actions.103
Regarding the classification as import commerce, the court held that
a defendant must be the importer of the component into the United
States.104 It was Motorola, through its foreign subsidiaries, that
imported forty-two percent of the LCD panels that eventually made
their way into the United States.105 Because Motorola, not the
defendants, imported the panels, the claim did not fall within the
“import exception,” and thus the FTAIA applied.106
The court did not provide detail as to what is required for conduct
to have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on
domestic commerce. However, it assumed that the conduct satisfied
the requirement because, though probably modest, the effect of the
conduct was “clearer” than in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc.,107 a case
where the effect was satisfied despite having a more tenuous impact.108
Assuming the direct effect, the court next looked to whether Motorola
satisfied the “gives rise to” exception, finding it did not.109
From the outset of the opinion, the court referred to Motorola as a
“derivative victim” and stated that the foreign subsidiaries were the true
victims.110 The court ran through an analysis of potential harm that
Motorola may have felt by the price increase, but said that such harm,
if any, was “indirect” and that there was no evidence indicating a loss

103. See id. at 825–26 (making a point during the discussion of international comity that
the United States does not police and enforce its laws on the world, and although Motorola
may not bring a private suit, the DOJ is up to the task of pursuing criminal charges).
104. Id. at 818. But see Animal Sci. Prods. v. China MinMetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462,
470 (3d Cir. 2011) (providing the Third Circuit’s broad interpretation of import
commerce that focuses on whether the defendant’s anticompetitive conduct merely
targeted the import market).
105. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 817.
106. Id. at 818.
107. 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012).
108. Id. at 856–57 (holding the potash agreement easily satisfied the substantial
effects and foreseeability requirements, while suggesting the direct requirement is not
a high bar and therefore is also met); Motorola, 775 F.3d at 819; Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai
Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d Cir. 2014) (interpreting direct to mean a
“reasonably proximate causal nexus”).
109. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 819 (finding that Motorola did not meet the statutory
requirement because “the cartel-engendered price increase in the components and in the
price of cellphones that incorporated them occurred entirely in foreign commerce”).
110. Id. at 818 (making an analogy to firms and owners of firms to emphasize that
the owner, Motorola, did not have a direct claim against the injuring party because
only the subsidiary was a victim of the unlawful acts).
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of business or customers as a result of having to raise its prices.111
Because the purchase of the component as well as the increase to the
price of the cellphone occurred entirely in foreign commerce, the
conduct harmed Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries, and should be
governed by the laws under which they incorporated and/or
operated.112 The court held that derivative victims do not have
standing to bring a claim, not only because they cannot satisfy the
“gives rise to” requirement, but because the “law does not collapse
parents and subsidiaries” into a “single integrated” entity.113 In so
holding, the result of the court’s interpretation was that foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. companies injured by cartels outsides of the United
States cannot satisfy the “gives rise to” provision.
The court continued, barring the claim on a separate, yet related
ground, that allowing such a claim violated the indirect purchaser
doctrine of Illinois Brick, and consumers (the indirect purchasers)
cannot sue the conspirator even though the seller (the direct
purchaser) passed on the increased cost to the consumers.114 The first
sale of the price-fixed component was to the foreign subsidiaries, and
there was nothing stopping those subsidiaries from suing the cartel in
either their own country or the country of the cartel members.115
Motorola, on the other hand, was the indirect purchaser, having
bought the incorporated product from the foreign subsidiary and thus
could not bring suit. The difficulty in estimating the amount of harm to
indirect purchasers, confirmed the “wisdom of the indirect purchaser
doctrine” because the price Motorola charged its consumers mitigated
any initial effect it felt.116 Motorola made the decision to do business with
111. Id. at 819 (commenting that Motorola actually may not have lost customers if
competitors also increased their prices, and that Motorola could have even made a
profit if it tried to cover the increased costs by charging consumers more).
112. Id. at 820 (stating clearly that the subsidiaries should be seeking relief from
injury under the appropriate laws, either from which they are governed or for those
which govern the conspirators).
113. Id. at 820, 823 (emphasizing that even if the conclusion is wrong, and
“Motorola is correct that it and its subsidiaries ‘are one,’ there was no sale by the
subsidiaries to Motorola . . . . ‘The one’ . . . would have been injured abroad when ‘it’
purchased the price-fixed components”).
114. Id. at 821 (noting that the plaintiff company and its consumers were merely
the indirect purchasers of the price-fixed components).
115. Id. at 820.
116. See id. at 821–22 (responding to the reality that “[t]his may result in a windfall
for the direct purchaser, but preserves the deterrent effect of antitrust damages
liability while eliding complex issues of apportionment” present in assessing impacts
of price-increase through various levels of distribution).
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foreign subsidiaries and could not avoid the legal implications of that
structure when it was convenient or in its interests to do so.117
After ruling against Motorola and its subsidiaries, the court moved
into a discussion of international comity and the need for caution in
allowing claims like that of Motorola because doing so would
“enormously increase the global reach of the Sherman Act, creating
friction with many foreign countries and ‘resent[ment at] the
apparent effort of the United States to act as the world’s competition
police officer.’”118 The court stressed the globalized supply chains and
use of foreign subsidiaries in today’s economy, and that courts should
not extend coverage of U.S. law to include foreign subsidiaries injured
abroad by conduct that occurred in foreign commerce.119
In response to a government request, the court amended its opinion
to ease concern regarding criminal enforcement by providing a
distinction between private actions and criminal actions pursued by
the DOJ.120 Though Motorola’s claim could not move forward, the
court assured that its holding would not prevent the DOJ from seeking
criminal charges if the effect of the price-fixing scheme had the
required effect on cellphone prices in the United States.121 The
Motorola case was based on a private claim, and the court indicated that
private claims involving international component cartels create more
problems than criminal claims, and should thus be handled differently
under antitrust law. The court reasoned that in the context of
international component cartels, the U.S. government will weigh
considerations of international comity and foreign sovereignty,
whereas private plaintiffs will not.122 District courts within the Sixth
117. See id. at 822 (choosing to do business in such a way does not allow businesses to
“pick and choose from the benefits and burdens of United States corporate citizenship”).
118. Id. at 824 (quoting United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942,
960–62 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,
542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (noting that the Supreme Court has warned that rampant
extraterritorial application of the U.S. law “creates a serious risk of interference with a
foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs”).
119. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 824.
120. Id. at 825–26. After a decision ruling against Motorola, the DOJ filed an amicus
brief requesting that the Seventh Circuit amend the opinion to clearly state that the
holding would not impact the government’s ability to pursue a criminal case against
the foreign conspirators for the impact to the U.S. commerce. Id. Among additional
language to emphasize its opinion, the Supreme Court clarified that the decision
would not prevent the criminal punishment for the harmful price-fixing conduct.
Giudice, supra note 24.
121. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 825–26.
122. Id. at 827.
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Circuit have followed similar logic in approaching these types of cases,
relying on the Motorola reasoning in their decisions.123
Ninth Circuit and United States v. Hui Hsiung
The criminal case against Hui Hsiung and others (including AU
Optronics Corp. and AU Optronics Corp. America, Inc.), United States
v. Hsiung,124 involved the same conspiracy at issue in Motorola.125 In
brief, the Federal Bureau of Investigation found proof of an
international conspiracy between Taiwanese and Korean electronics
manufacturers to fix the price of LCD panels sold to companies in the
United States.126 The court principally held that the manufacturers’
sales made directly to the U.S. retailer constituted import commerce,
so the FTAIA did not need to be addressed for those portions of the
sales.127 Looking at several facts, including that the United States held
one-third of the global market for personal computers with these LCD
panels and that the evidence showed defendants specifically “targeted”
U.S. companies, the court held that “import trade” could include
defendants whose conduct was “directed” at American imports, thus
bringing it back within the scope of the Sherman Act.128
At the time of this case, the Ninth Circuit had not yet defined what
was included within “import trade”; however, the court looked to the
Seventh, Sixth, and Third Circuits for guidance.129 To hold that
conduct “directed” at U.S. imports could classify as “import
commerce,” the court look at the Seventh and Sixth Circuits’
definitions stating that conduct could be an import trade if it pertained

2.

123. See generally In re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litig., No. 2:209-md-02042,
2016 WL 6138600, at *1, *4, *9 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2016) (relying on Motorola to hold
that the domestic plaintiff was the importer of the component and could not treat its
foreign manufacturing subsidiary as “an extension of itself for purposes of satisfying
the FTAIA or avoiding the indirect-purchaser-standing rule”).
124. 778 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2015).
125. See id. at 743 (regarding the “Crystal Meetings” and the Taiwanese conspiracy
to fix the price of LCD panels eventually sold in the United States to companies,
including Motorola).
126. Id. The manufacturers sold to companies including Dell, Hewlett Packard,
Compaq, Apple, and Motorola. Id. at 743.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 755, 755 n.8 (holding that the conduct was classified as “import trade”
and as such not governed by the FTAIA, but stating in a footnote that the Third Circuit
allows jurisdiction over activities “directed at a U.S. import market” to satisfy the
exception under the FTAIA).
129. Id. at 754–55, 755 n.8.
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to a “direct” transaction between a U.S. purchaser and the cartel.130
Despite determining that the case fell within “import commerce” and
therefore, that the FTAIA would not apply, the government proceeded
with a domestic effects theory.131 The court held that the FTAIA would
not block the government from seeking a claim against foreign
conspirators in this context.132 Speaking to the domestic effects theory,
the court held that the conduct met the requirements because it had
a “direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S.
commerce.133 Other courts dealing with similar issues have followed
the reasoning that the Hsiung court set forth.134

130. Id. at 755 (emphasis added); see also Animal Sci. Prods. Inc. v. China Minmetals
Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 470–71 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the import trade exclusion
includes both actual importers as well as those who, while not having imported the
product themselves, participated in anticompetitive conduct directed at the United
States). But see Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 818 (7th
Cir. 2015) (citing Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 853–54 (7th Cir.
2012) (holding the import commerce is limited in scope to situations where the
defendant physically imports the price-fixed goods to the United States); Lotes Co. v.
Han Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d Cir. 2014) (requiring only a
“reasonably proximate causal nexus”).
131. Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 756. The court decision rested on the “import commerce”
exception and did not discuss whether the provision “can independently support a
criminal prosecution.” See Ian Simmons et al., Where to Draw the Line: Should the FTAIA’s
Domestic Effects Test Apply in Criminal Prosecutions?, 29 ANTITRUST 42, 43–46 (2015)
(criticizing the Court’s decision in Hsiung and arguing that the FTAIA’s “domestic
effects” exception should not be applicable in criminal prosecutions).
132. Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 756.
133. Id. at 758.
134. See In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1022–
23 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that whether the defendant was the importer was less
important than whether the price-fixed components (CRTs) were sold in the United
States). The court cited to cases where downstream, indirect plaintiff purchasers had
standing to bring a claim against the manufacturer. See id. at 1023 (citing In re
Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that plaintiffs
who purchased linerboard from defendants had standing in alleged conspiracy to fix
prices of linerboard)). Another court to follow suit after Hsiung was Costco Wholesale
Corp. v. AU Optronics Corp, No. C13-1207RAJ, 2016 WL 4017462, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar.
3, 2016), which alleged the same price-fixing conduct found in Motorola and Hsiung.
See id. at *2–*3. Despite its similarities to Motorola, the court took a totality of the
circumstances approach to allow the plaintiff’s claim and classified the conduct as
import commerce simply because the price-fixed panels “were sold in a transaction
between a member of the conspiracy and a customer in the United States.” Id. at *4.
The court stated that even if the conduct was not import commerce, the effect was
“direct” because it had “an immediate impact on later sales.” Id. at *5. Finally, the
Costco court distinguished the facts from Motorola regarding the “give rise to”
requirement, because the plaintiff did not make its purchase through foreign
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III. RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Certiorari Denials
Recently, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on two cases, which
had it granted, could have resolved the circuit confusion and cleared
up the ambiguities surrounding the extraterritoriality of the FTAIA.
The Court denied certiorari to both Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU
Optronics Corp. and United States v. Hsiung.135 The denial shocked many
in the antitrust community because “the conflict between the circuit
courts’ interpretations of the FTAIA ‘could not be sharper’ [given
that] [t]he two cases dealt with the same products, the same
conspiracy, and the same FTAIA provisions—and yet the circuit courts
arrived at diametrically opposite conclusions.”136 In Motorola, the
Seventh Circuit did not classify the conduct as “import commerce”
because the product was imported through foreign subsidiaries.137
Further, the court held that the injury did not arise from the effect on
domestic commerce, failing to satisfy the requirements of the FTAIA
necessary to bring the conduct back under the control of the Sherman
Act.138 Conversely, in Hsiung, the Ninth Circuit held that the same
conduct classified as “import commerce” because the components were
eventually sold, through final products, to U.S. customers and thus the
FTAIA did not prevent the DOJ from pursuing a criminal case.139
The issues surrounding these cases were ripe for review and, had the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, it likely would have analyzed the
issues together, addressing the questions asked by the parties in both
cases.140 In its petition, Motorola asked: “Is a cartel’s delivery of price-

subsidiaries, but from U.S. vendors who originally purchased the components from
the conspirators. Id. at *5–*6. The court did not discuss the question of whether this
decision violated Illinois Brick and the indirect purchaser doctrine. See id. (failing to
discuss the applicability of the indirect purchaser doctrine).
135. Antitrust Update, supra note 94. The Supreme Court denied certiorari to both
cases in 2015. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th
Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015) (Mem.); United States v. Hsiung, 778 F.3d
738 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015) (Mem.).
136. Antitrust Update, supra note 94.
137. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 818.
138. Id. at 820–21.
139. Hsiung, 778 F.3d 742 at 755–56.
140. Clarification of these issues is crucial because it would “allow individuals and
businesses (and their legal counsel) to anticipate correctly the legal consequences of
their marketplace conduct, thereby enhancing compliance and conserving agency
(and judicial) resources devoted to enforcement.” Joint Comments, supra note 51, at 3.
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fixed goods overseas for incorporation into finished products
imported directly to the United States immune from private suit under
U.S. antitrust law?”141 The petition from Hsiung asked related
questions: (1) “Whether a foreign seller’s conduct can ‘involv[e] . . .
import trade or import commerce’ even when the seller himself does
not import any goods into the United States;” and (2) “Whether a
foreign price-fixing agreement can have an effect on U.S. commerce
that is ‘direct’ and ‘gives rise to’ a Sherman Act claim even when the
agreement fixes prices only in foreign sales.”142 The denials of
certiorari have left these and many other questions unanswered;
however, a recent Supreme Court decision may provide insight into
the approach the Justices might have taken.
B. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community
Confusion among the courts persists after these denials, and although
the Supreme Court has not handed down a decision directly
interpreting the FTAIA, it recently decided RJR Nabisco, which
concerned the extraterritoriality of RICO.143 In 2000, the European
Community, on behalf of itself and twenty-six-member states, filed suit
in the Eastern District of New York alleging a global money-laundering
scheme between traffickers to sell drugs throughout Europe, resulting
in competitive harm to the respondents.144 RJR Nabisco, a company

141. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Motorola, No. 14-1122, cert. denied; see Giudice,
supra note 24.
142. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hsiung, No. 14-1121, cert. denied; see Giudice,
supra note 24. The Supreme Court could have addressed other issues as evidenced by
the several requests made for clarification by the ABA regarding the guidelines. See
generally, Joint Comments, supra note 51, at 1–2, 4, 14.
143. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (plurality opinion).
144. 136 S. Ct. at 2098. See generally, John Bellinger, III, et al., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
The European Community: Supreme Court Limits RICO’s Extraterritorial Reach, ARNOLD
& PORTER ADVISORY (June 22, 2016), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/persp
ectives/publications/2016/06/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-the-european-community (providing
further background and details on the facts of the case). The original case, brought
in the Eastern District of New York, provides the extensive list of Member States
represented by the European Community: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. European
Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771, 2011 WL 843957, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8,
2011). See generally, Matthew J. Gabel, European Community, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Community-European-economicassociation (last updated Sept. 28, 2018) (providing historical background on the
European Community as a “principal component” of the European Union).
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alleged to have “engaged in a pattern of racketeering,” including
conspiracy, money laundering, and supporting foreign terrorism, moved
to dismiss the claim arguing that RICO did not apply to activity occurring
outside of U.S. borders nor did it apply to a foreign enterprise.145
1. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
Section 1962 of the RICO statute provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has
participated as a principal . . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.146

Section 1964 of the RICO statute also adds that:
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold
the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit . . . .147

The RICO statute created criminal offenses for activities of
organized criminal groups in relation to enterprise.148 RICO also set
out a civil cause of action for violations of an act that injures any
person’s business or property.149
2.

Procedural history
The district court dismissed the case, agreeing that the claim was
“impermissibly extraterritorial,” but on appeal the Second Circuit
reinstated the claim on the grounds that Congress intended the statute
to apply extraterritorially to certain conduct provided that the
violations serve as the basis for the liability under RICO.150

145. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2098–99.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2012).
147. Id. § 1964(c).
148. Id. §§ 1961–1968. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Criminal Rico: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968 a Manual for Federal Prosecutors 1–2 (6th ed. 2016) [hereinafter Criminal RICO
Manual] (providing examples of racketeering offenses under the RICO statute
including “extortion, interstate theft, narcotics violations, mail fraud, securities fraud,
[and] currency reporting violations”).
149. § 1964(c); RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2096.
150. Id. at 2099 (citing European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 137 (2d
Cir. 2014)).
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Additionally, the Second Circuit held on a rehearing that a RICO claim
did not require domestic injury.151 Seeing the importance of the issue,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.152 In its
review, the Court addressed two questions: (1) whether the substantive
provisions of § 1962 applied to conduct which occurred in foreign
countries, and (2) whether the § 1964(c) private right of action
applied to injuries suffered in foreign countries.153
3.

Analytical framework
Based on recent precedent, the Supreme Court followed a two-step
framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues generally: (1) the
presumption against extraterritoriality; and (2) the statute’s “focus.”154
The first step requires analysis of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, a canon of statutory construction.155 Absent a clear
congressional intent to the contrary, the presumption against
extraterritoriality stands and the law applies domestically.156 If the
court finds that the statute has extraterritorial effect, thus overcoming
the presumption, it will have no need to consider the “focus” and the
analysis ends.157 However, if the presumption is not overcome, a court

151. Id. (citing European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 149, 150 (2d Cir.
2014) (per curium)).
152. Id. at 2096.
153. Id. at 2096–97; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c).
154. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100–01 (noting that step one grew out of a basic
premise that “United States law governs domestically, but does not rule the world”
(quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)); Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 111–13 (2013) (reviewing the extraterritoriality of
the Alien Tort Statute); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255–56
(2010), superseded by statute, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864–65 (2010), (reviewing the
extraterritoriality of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
155. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100; see also Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117, 122–24 (recognizing
that the presumption limits courts’ ability to exercise jurisdiction because the
presumption against extraterritoriality “guards against our courts triggering such serious
foreign policy consequences”); Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255 (explaining that the principle
of the presumption against extraterritoriality “rests on the perception that Congress
ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign, matters,” and courts must
assess whether it is overcome in any context regardless of a conflict of laws).
156. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100–01 (clarifying that for any statute, courts must
discern whether the presumption has been overcome based on a clear limitation
placed on its extraterritorial application by Congress).
157. Id. at 2100–01 (distinguishing from Morrison and Kiobel, two cases where the
presumption was not rebutted, and the court looked at the “focus”).
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must move on to the second step and determine whether the case
involves a domestic application of the statute by finding its “focus.”158
4.

Holdings
On the first issue, the Supreme Court held that the RICO statute
clearly applied to some foreign conduct—thus rebutting the
presumption—because Congress made specific reference to instances
involving a domestic defendant and offenses taking place outside of
the United States.159 In agreement with the Second Circuit, the Court
held that the inclusion of these instances provided an implicit
indication that the law of § 1962 was to apply extraterritorially.160
However, the Court clarified that although a domestic enterprise is not
required, not “every foreign enterprise will qualify . . . [and RICO]
requires proof . . . [that the enterprise is] ‘engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.’”161
On the second issue of whether the private right of action under
RICO is available to plaintiffs with foreign injuries, the Court held that
the plaintiff did not successfully overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality.162 The Court stressed that the presumption applied
separately to both provisions of RICO, and in application to § 1964 it
was not overcome because providing such private civil remedy
“create[d] a potential for international friction beyond that presented
by merely applying U.S. substantive law to that foreign conduct.”163
The Court continued to explain its reasoning through an analogy to
antitrust law.164 Several respondents in the current case had also
advised the Court in Empagran of the ramifications to their own
antitrust schemes if U.S. remedies were applied to their citizens.165 For
this reason, a private right of action under RICO requires

158. Id. at 2101.
159. Id. at 2101–02. Though not expressly stated, Congress’s definition of
“racketeering activity” included violations of other statutes that do explicitly state
extraterritorial application. Id.
160. Id. at 2102.
161. Id. at 2105 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (2012)).
162. Id. at 2106 (“Irrespective of any extraterritorial application of § 1962, we conclude
that § 1964(c) does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.”).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2106–07.
165. Id.; see supra Section I.C.3 (discussing Empagran). Foreign antitrust laws were
created in consideration of their own domestic needs and priorities. To simply allow
for a U.S. remedy would be to allow foreign citizens to ignore the concerns behind
their policy choices. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106–07.
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“[s]omething more” beyond a finding that the substantive provision
reaches foreign conduct, and in this context “it [was] absent.”166
Therefore, in holding that the presumption stands, the Court
established a requirement for a private RICO plaintiff to prove a
“domestic injury.”167 The Court found support for this decision in the
language of the statute: “‘[A]ny person injured’ . . . by a violation.”168
Though the word “any” typically indicates broad inclusively, the Court
said the word on its own cannot overcome the presumption.169
Finally, the Court expressly disagreed with respondent’s and Justice
Ginsberg’s argument that the private right of action was modeled after
the Clayton Act, and therefore, should allow for plaintiffs to sue for
foreign injury.170 While the Clayton Act often guided interpretations
of § 1964(c), the Court was convinced that current doctrine and recent
congressional actions advised against doing so here.171 Further, the
Court dismissed earlier concerns that not applying U.S. antitrust law to
foreign defendants would defeat its purpose because to use this
concern as a justification would be to “divin[e] what Congress would
have wanted” and such judicial approach should not be followed.172
The Court’s “reluctance” not to read § 1964(c) as broadly as the
Clayton Act has been read previously is “[u]nderscor[ed] . . . [in]
Congress’s more recent decision to define precisely the antitrust laws’
extraterritorial effect,” excluding “conduct that ‘causes only foreign
injury.’”173 Further, the Court states that the enactment of the FTAIA

166. Id. at 2108.
167. Id. at 2106.
168. Id. at 2108 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c))
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2109 (noting that section 4 of Clayton Act served as a model during the
creation of the private right of action under RICO). See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012)
(stating in relevant part that “any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the Unites States . . . and shall recover three-fold the damages by him
sustained”). See generally The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/
tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Dec.
3, 2018). The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, amending the Sherman Act explicitly
by prohibiting additional conduct and allowing private parties to recover triple
damages for harm from antitrust violations. Id.
171. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2110.
172. Id. (quoting Pfizer Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 414 (1978)).
173. Id. at 2110–11 (quoting F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S.
155, 158 (2004) (describing the FTAIA and that application of U.S. law will differ based
on which type of actor is bringing the claim)).
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“counsel[ed] against importing into RICO those Clayton Act principles
that are at odds with . . . current extraterritoriality doctrine.”174
IV. ANALYSIS
The RJR Nabisco decision is analogous to, and instructive on, the analysis
of extraterritoriality of U.S. antitrust law relating to the FTAIA. The
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the scope of the FTAIA, as it relates to
component cartels, is in line with this recent Supreme Court decision.
Though non-binding, the Court’s interpretation of the federal RICO
statute provides insight into the proper way to interpret the FTAIA.175
A. Analogizing RICO and the FTAIA
Drawing the analogy between RICO and the FTAIA is possible
because the Supreme Court does so itself in RJR Nabisco by relying on
antitrust law and previous decisions it has made regarding the
extraterritorial reach of federal statutes.176 The Court saw a similarity
between the two issues—racketeering and antitrust law—in the RJR
Nabisco case and relied on antitrust law and its precedent to determine
the extraterritoriality of another federal statute (RICO).177 Though
the Court declined to apply the broad application found in the Clayton
Act regarding a private right of action, it did so to balance against
strong concerns of “international friction” and to rule in accordance
with more recent congressional decisions to “reign in” the reach of
such laws.178 By not prescribing the scope of the Clayton Act, the Court
acknowledged that the purpose of enacting laws like the FTAIA was to
narrow the scope of U.S. antitrust law, and that to allow a foreign
plaintiff’s recovery would go against current extraterritoriality
jurisprudence.179 Accordingly, the Court found that the enactment of

174. Id.
175. Reznick, supra note 93; Jacobovitz, supra note 28, at 9 (predicting that “the
Supreme Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco v. European Community . . . which addressed
the extraterritorial application of the federal RICO statute—cited to, and may
ultimately help shape, the FTAIA”).
176. See supra notes 162–166 and accompanying text.
177. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106–07.
178. Id. at 2109–10. See Reznick, supra note 93 (“While an extraterritoriality rule
arising out of the construction of a purpose-made federal statute (the FTAIA) may seem
less amenable to change than one simply construing a private right of action, this Court
seems determined to reign in federal jurisdiction involving expensive litigation.”).
179. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2110 (suggesting that prior antitrust jurisprudence
and the current Supreme Court view may not be in accordance).
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the FTAIA, while not independently limiting on RICO, nonetheless
discouraged using Sherman Act principles to discern the scope of
RICO.180 The Court’s holding to deny a private action for foreign
injury from racketeering activity in RJR Nabisco reflects this analysis.181
Additionally, the similarities between RICO and the Sherman Act, to
which the FTAIA limits, are apparent—both are federal statutes aimed
at counteracting corrupt activity at home and abroad having significant
impacts on the commerce of the United States. Further, the relevant
discussion surrounding both these statutes centers around the
extraterritoriality of a federal U.S. law regarding corrupt practices,
whether it be racketeering or price-fixing.182 It is true that the two
statutes pertain to separate issues—the RICO statute deals with
racketeering activity and the FTAIA with antitrust violations.183
Reducing the laws to their differences, however, is an oversimplified
comparison. When reviewing the extraterritoriality of U.S. law, the
analysis is the same in every situation, requiring the court to run
through the same two-steps outlined in RJR Nabisco.184 Further, in both
statutes, the conduct at issue is not the focus of that analysis, but rather
the impact of the conduct—the effect on U.S. commerce.185 In fact,
the laws do prohibit overlapping conduct, such as conspiracy, and both
require a substantive showing that the conduct at issue had a requisite
effect on domestic commerce.186

180. Id. at 2110–11.
181. See id. at 2110.
182. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012) (outlining four criminal actions of organized crime
and use of income from such crime by “any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce”); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2012) (making it illegal to restrain “trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations” which includes conspiracy).
183. See Criminal RICO Manual, supra note 148, at 1–5; DOJ & FTC Antitrust
Guidelines, supra note 14, at 1–5 (describing prohibited conduct under the Sherman
Act including price fixing, customer allocation, bid rigging, cartel activities,
competition-reducing mergers, and monopolization).
184. See supra notes 154–158 and accompanying text.
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (removing from reach “activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce”); FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(A) (excluding “conduct
involving trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations unless . . . such conduct has a
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect . . . on trade or commerce”).
186. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person who has received
any income derived . . . from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to use or invest . . .
in . . . activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.”); 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)
(“[S]uch conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect . . . on
commerce . . . in the United States.”).
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Further, for a private plaintiff to bring a claim under either law, the
plaintiff must make a showing of “domestic injury” because neither law
intends to give relief for all foreign injuries occurring outside the
United States.187 Lastly, both statutes allow for criminal and private
causes of action.188
B. Incorporating RJR Nabisco
1.

Statutory construction
In many of its decisions, the Court highlighted the importance of
congressional intent and use of the statutory canons of construction
when analyzing the presumption against extraterritoriality.189 The
Court in RJR Nabisco discussed the presumption of all statutes against
extraterritoriality, unless there is congressional indication otherwise;
therefore, the presumption would apply to an analysis of the
extraterritoriality of the FTAIA.190 Further, the presumption applies to
each part of a statute.191 Just as the Court separately analyzed the
presumption against the two provisions of the RICO statute in RJR
Nabisco, courts must look at each requirement of the FTAIA to
determine whether the presumption has been overcome.192

187. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016) (plurality
opinion). See 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (providing that the effect must “give[] rise” to the
plaintiff’s claim).
188. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012); RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
189. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100 (applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality to the federal RICO statute and discussing the reasoning for the
presumption); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 596 U.S. 108, 115 (2013)
(applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to an issue of extraterritorial
application of the Alien Tort Statute and finding nothing to rebut the presumption);
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010), superseded by statute, DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), (explaining its decision to apply the presumption in
every case, the Court noted that the disregard of the presumption in the past has led
to unpredictability); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1077, (discussing the
“longstanding principle of American law” that an act of Congress was intended to apply
domestically, unless there is evidence of a contrary intent).
190. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100 (implementing “the presumption across the
board, regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between the American statute
and a foreign law” (internal quotes omitted)).
191. Id. at 2106. Even though the substantive provision of RICO overcame the
presumption, the Court emphasized that the presumption must apply independently
to each cause of action. Id.
192. See supra notes 159–173 and accompanying text.
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Similar to RJR Nabisco, the substantive provisions of the FTAIA
overcome the presumption.193 Separating the two provisions, § 6a(1)
provides the substantive law of the FTAIA, determining whether the
conduct at issue falls within the Sherman Act’s reach by having a
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S.
commerce.194 The FTAIA and Sherman Act would likely be a similarly
“rare statute,” like RICO, because neither expressly states
extraterritoriality, but context clearly provides for it.195 Congress
enacted the FTAIA to specifically address when the Sherman Act
should apply extraterritorially, indicating that, provided the criteria
have been met, there are circumstances where the law brings foreign
conduct within reach.196
Also consistent with the reasoning of RJR Nabisco, the FTAIA can be
read to have a separate private right of action because § 6a(1) describes
what claims plaintiffs can bring, whereas § 6a(2) describes which
plaintiffs can bring those claims.197 By looking at criminal and private
civil claims differently under the FTAIA, a division taken by the RJR
Nabisco Court in the analysis of RICO, one would find that § 6a(2) is
applicable to private claims.198 In the criminal context, when the
government brings an action for an antitrust violation, it does so “on
behalf of the United States” seeking to stop conduct that had “a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce,” thus
giving rise to the government’s claim.199 When the government brings

193. See supra notes 159–161 and accompanying text.
194. Compare FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2012), with RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012)
(prohibiting patterns of activities “of which affect interstate or foreign commerce”).
195. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2103–04 (stating that, though rare, it is clear and
easy to see why Congress would not limit application of the statute to domestic
enterprises); H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 10 (1982) (qualifying the explanation of the
requisite domestic effect by stating that the Act “does not exclude all persons injured
abroad from recovering under the antitrust laws of the United States”).
196. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (excluding foreign conduct, but subjecting foreign conduct
to U.S. law provided the “conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect” and “such effect gives rise to a claim,” thus anticipating situations where foreign
conduct is within the scope of antitrust law); H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 9–10 (clarifying
that U.S. courts should not exercise jurisdiction over foreign transactions absent “a
direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic commerce or a
domestic competitor”).
197. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (requiring that the necessary effect of § 6a(1) “give[] rise
to a claim”). As stated in RJR Nabisco, this provision has been interpreted to mean giving
rise to the “particular” plaintiff’s claim. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
198. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2).
199. See DOJ & FTC Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 14, at 26; Jacobovitz, supra note 28.
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a claim and the conduct satisfies the substantive requirements, that
effect will conceivably always satisfy § 6a(2); and thus, the section
would only bar private actions that do not arise from a domestic
injury.200 Provided this, as in RJR Nabisco, foreign plaintiffs claiming
foreign injury could not rebut the presumption because such claims
create the same international friction.201 As the RJR Nabisco court
discussed, providing private remedies for foreign anticompetitive
conduct to foreign plaintiffs creates a greater problem of international
friction than it does when criminally prosecuting that foreign conduct
because it allows foreign citizens to bypass the potentially less generous
antitrust laws of their own nations.202 If the plaintiff cannot prove a
domestic injury in addition to the requisite effect on domestic
commerce, the court cannot entertain the private claim.203 Further,
the Sherman Act defines a “claimant” as “a person . . . that has
brought . . . a civil action alleging a violation of section 1 or 3 of the
Sherman Act.”204 The term “a person” is comparable to the term “any
person” as used in RICO, and similar to the reasoning in RJR Nabisco,
the use of the term “a person,” while ordinarily broad in scope, does
not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.205
2.

Legislative history
Absent a statute’s express showing of intent, legislative history can
be instructive to find the purpose and intent behind its enactment.206
The legislative history for the FTAIA illustrates its intended
extraterritorial applicability and supports a position consistent with the

200. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 13 (weighing concerns that international cartel
activity would increase due to the legislation, Congress reassured that such activities
and their impact would likely trigger jurisdiction under which the government could
still enforce the antitrust laws).
201. See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text.
202. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106–07 (2016)
(plurality opinion) (acknowledging the competing interests of other nations; nations
that had raised concerns in other contexts such as antitrust).
203. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
204. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1(4) (2012).
205. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2108.
206. See Julia Taylor, Legislative History Research: A Guide to Resources for Congressional
Staff 1 CONG. RES. SERV. (2013) (providing an overview of legislative history as a research
tool for interpreting statutes because it provides “background and events leading to the
enactment of a statute, including hearings, committee reports, and floor debates”).
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reasoning in RJR Nabisco.207 The Court in RJR Nabisco relied on recent
congressional actions, reflecting the modern extraterritorial doctrine
(referencing the enactment of the FTAIA), to narrow the
extraterritorial scope of a private claim under RICO.208 In doing so,
the Court nods to Congress’s intention behind the enactment,
supporting a narrower reading of antitrust laws.
The application of the rationale from the RJR Nabisco decision is
consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
FTAIA. The purpose of the FTAIA was to clarify and potentially limit
the reach of the Sherman Act.209 As reflected in the committee report,
Congress did not intend to broaden the scope of U.S. antitrust law for
cases of foreign injury to foreign plaintiffs caused by foreign conduct.210
In enacting the FTAIA, Congress sought to ease the concerns of U.S.
exporters about liability under the Sherman Act for participating in a
foreign market where anticompetitive conduct may be necessary to
succeed.211
Congress wanted to encourage U.S. exporters by
addressing concerns from the business community that establishment
of antitrust law would bar joint export activities.212 Bearing this
purpose in mind, “to protect American exporters, it does not make sense
to protect foreign plaintiffs injured by effects felt abroad, and not by
effect to the U.S. market.”213 This sentiment is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s emphasis on the principle that U.S. federal law is not
meant to govern the world and will not intend to bring foreign
plaintiffs’ injuries within the reach of its jurisdiction.214 Put another

207. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 7 (1982) (amending the current antitrust laws at
the time to offer clarification when international anticompetitive conduct is to be
governed by such laws).
208. The Committee Report reflects a narrowing of applicability, a trend supported
by the Court in RJR Nabisco. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2110–11 (declining to apply
the broader application principles of the Clayton Act because recent congressional
acts, including the enactment of the FTAIA, have altered the current extraterritoriality
doctrine); H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 10, 13 (restricting extraterritorial application in
those contexts where the conduct does not have the requisite effects).
209. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a; supra Section I.B.1.
210. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 9 (“A transaction between two foreign firms, even if
American-owned, should not, merely by virtue of the American ownership, come with
the reach of our antitrust laws.”).
211. Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 15, at 22.
212. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2–3, 9–10.
213. Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 15, at 22.
214. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004)
(questioning why application of American law to conduct that causes foreign harm is
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way, foreign plaintiffs cannot merely “piggy-back” off of a U.S. entity to
seek recovery under U.S. law.215
C. Seventh Circuit and Motorola
In addition to being able to draw a comparison between the statutes,
the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the FTAIA is most analogous to
the interpretation of the RICO statute in this recent Supreme Court
decision. Further, the Court’s distinction between the substantive law
and private right of action leads to the conclusion that the Seventh
Circuit is more in line with the reasoning and current thinking of the
Court and its precedent regarding extraterritoriality of federal statutes.
Concerns of international comity and friction aligned with those the
Court expressed in RJR Nabisco. The Seventh Circuit in Motorola
correctly stated that the purpose behind the FTAIA, in consideration
of international comity, was to limit the scope of U.S. antitrust law.216
The potential for international friction weighed heavily on both the
Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court, which received several amicus
briefs from foreign countries expressing their concern about the
implications of applying U.S. law would have on their own antitrust
policies.217 Further marking the importance of this consideration,
both courts quoted Empagran, supporting the view that allowing
foreign entities to benefit from U.S. antitrust law would “be an
unjustified interference” with foreign nations and likely cause
“resentment at the apparent effort of the United States to act as the
world’s competition police officer.”218
Just as the RJR Nabisco Court analyzed the statute as two separate
requirements—looking at its substantive provision apart from the
provision allowing for a right of action—the Seventh Circuit in Motorola
better than allowing the foreign nation to decide how to best protect its customers,
concluding that “the justification . . . seems insubstantial”).
215. Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 15, at 23.
216. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 2015).
217. Id. at 817; RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106–07
(2016) (plurality opinion).
218. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 824. The court in Motorola makes a point to quote
Empagran in asking the question: “Why should American law supplant, for example,
Canada’s or Great Britain’s or Japan’s own determination about how best to protect
Canadian or British or Japanese customers from anticompetitive conduct engaged in
significant part by Canadian or British or Japanese or other foreign companies?” Id.
at 825 (quoting Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165). See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106–07
(raising the same international concerns about giving recovery to foreign injuries as
expressed in Empagran).
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noted the essentiality of looking at the two requirements separately,
providing that one establishes the existence of a claim, and the other
establishes whether the plaintiff has standing to bring that claim.219
Assessing the first requirement, the holding in Motorola, that there
could be such an effect for foreign conduct, is consistent with the
holding in RJR Nabisco, that the substantive provision overcame the
presumption and therefore, some conduct, though foreign, will be
within scope of U.S. federal law in certain circumstances.220
In assessing the second requirement of the FTAIA, the Seventh
Circuit in Motorola determined that the foreign subsidiaries of
Motorola could not, through Motorola, seek damages under the
Sherman Act.221 Just as the Supreme Court held in RJR Nabisco, the
presumption against extraterritoriality was not overcome regarding
the provision of who can bring a claim, and required a foreign plaintiff
show domestic injury.222 The Motorola court similarly did not find
domestic injury for a foreign plaintiff who was injured by foreign
conduct occurring abroad.223
Lastly, the Motorola decision—holding that the foreign plaintiff did
not have a private right of action—did not hinder the DOJ in
criminally pursuing illegal activity directly affecting commerce of the
United States.224 This holding reflects the understanding that there is
a critical distinction between private actions and those brought by the
DOJ.225 Such a concept is consistent with the Supreme Court’s clear
distinction between the application of substantive law and existence of
a private right of action under RICO, and courts should treat them
differently in determining the extraterritoriality of the law.226 To

219. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 818; see RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106, 2108.
220. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101; Motorola, 775 F.3d at 819.
221. See Motorola, 775 F.3d at 824–25.
222. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2105 (finding that although “RICO imposes no
domestic enterprise requirement [presumption rebutted as to which claims], this does
not mean that every foreign enterprise will qualify”); Motorola, 775 F.3d at 818 (looking
at the requirements separately, distinguishing the analysis for what violations can be
brought and secondly, who can claim them).
223. See Motorola, 775 F.3d at 827.
224. Id.
225. Id. The court notes that China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan all raised serious
concerns about the “expansive application” of the U.S. antitrust laws; however, “[n]o
nation . . . objected to the DOJ’s successful prosecution of foreign companies and even
citizens,” only highlighting that “the comity considerations with private plaintiffs are
quite different.” Id.
226. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106.
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underscore this distinction, the Seventh Circuit made clear that to
deny the private claim would not inhibit the DOJ’s ability to seek a
criminal claim, provided the impact to cellphone prices in the Unites
States met the statutory requirements.227 This holding not only aligns
with Supreme Court precedent, but did not directly conflict with
outcome in Hsiung, in which the Ninth Circuit allowed the DOJ to
bring the cause of action.228
V. POLICY
In RJR Nabisco, the Supreme Court applied its reasoning in
Empagran, which declined to extend the extraterritorial application of
antitrust law in certain cases, to analyze the extraterritorial application
of the federal RICO statute.229 Citing Empagran, the Court highlighted
that the application of U.S. private damages to foreign conduct
sparked controversy with foreign nations which said the application
allows its citizens to bypass the foreign nations’ laws.230 The Court
wrote in its opinion that “[a]llowing recovery for foreign injuries in a
civil RICO action, including treble damages, presents the same danger
of international friction.”231 Ignoring the analogy to antitrust law
would be ignoring the clearly expressed concern about infringing on
a foreign nation’s ability to enforce its own antitrust scheme. In an
amicus brief, France expressed concern that extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law would “upset that delicate balance and
offend the sovereign interests of foreign nations.”232 Many other
nations shared this concern, and the Supreme Court made clear that
it should be a major consideration and antitrust precedent in its
discussion of this issue agrees.233
227. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 827.
228. See United States v. Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 756 (9th Cir. 2015) (allowing the
government’s claim against Hsiung to pursue Sherman Act charges); Reznick, supra
note 93 (highlighting that the separate analysis of the two issues “is consistent with
Hsiung” in the Ninth Circuit).
229. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106–07.
230. Id. at 2107.
231. Id.
232. Brief for Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 25–
26, Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (No. 08-1191).
233. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269–70 (2010), superseded by
statute, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864–65 (2010), (referencing briefs submitted by Australia, the
United Kingdom, and France); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S.
155, 167–68 (2004) (referencing briefs submitted by Germany, Canada, and Japan).
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Some commentators argue that the United States needs to bring
within the reach of its law anything that affects the United States, and
that broadening the scope of laws such as RICO and the FTAIA is
necessary because of globalization and complicated chains of
production.234 However, that very argument can be turned on its head.
The more complicated and more connected the world becomes, the
more inevitable it is that nearly all foreign conduct or every foreign
component will make its way to or its impacts will trickle into the
United States, and the United States cannot police the world.235 Not
having the U.S. antitrust laws available to them is a risk companies take
by doing business in or with companies located in countries where the
laws are more forgiving.236
Because “virtually every product sold in the United States has some
foreign-made component,” and because so many U.S. companies take
advantage of the use of global supply chains and foreign subsidiaries,
it is inevitable that companies will do business where anticompetitive
conduct is not enforced to the same extent as in the United States.237
In turn, it would be ignorant not to recognize that anticompetitive
conduct, such as price fixing, touches many products that make their
way into the United States. However, the foreign subsidiary is the only
entity overcharged, who passes the cost along to the U.S. purchaser,
who passes it along to their customers, and customers cannot bring
such a suit.238 If courts allowed a U.S. purchaser, such as Motorola, to
bring suit, it would open the gates to floods of private litigation on
behalf of all foreign subsidiaries.239 The “enormous potential for suits
234. See Ryu, supra note 76, at 87 (arguing that the Sherman Act should apply to
price-fixing component cartels “especially in today’s age of globalized supply chains”).
235. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165.
236. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 827 (7th Cir. 2015).
237. Id. at 826; see also Gregory Tassey, Competing in Advanced Manufacturing: The
Need for Improved Growth Models and Policies, 28 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 27, 31–35 (2014)
(analyzing how the rise in Asian countries’ abilities to manufacture products through
increased expertise and lower costs have taken over previously American
manufacturers, changing the supply chain); Dick K. Nanto, Globalized Supply Chains
and U.S. Policy CONG. RES. SERV. (2010) (discussing the difficulty for U.S. policy makers
“[i]n the globalized world of business, [where] production is becoming fragmented
into discrete activities and can be spread geographically within and across national
borders while remaining integrated organizationally within a multinational company
or network of companies”).
238. See Motorola, 775 F.3d at 821.
239. See id. at 826 (emphasizing that the Motorola case only involved ten foreign
subsidiaries; however, “[t]he mind boggles at the thought of the number of antitrust
suits that major American corporations could file against the multitudinous suppliers
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of this character,” underscores the need to treat criminal and private
claims differently.240 In determining whether to pursue a claim, “the
U.S. Government has reason to weigh comity and sovereignty
concerns . . . but private plaintiffs do not.”241
Additionally, the position that foreign subsidiaries should not be
able to “piggy-back” off of their U.S. parent company to seek damages
because it does not satisfy the “gives rise to” exception of the FTAIA is
supported in case law and in the American Law Reports.242 The
American Law Report asserts that despite attaching itself to a domestic
entity, a foreign entity’s injury remains just that: foreign.243
Further, while the Supreme Court in RJR Nabisco did not answer
specific questions—such as how to define “direct,” what classifies as an
import, or whether the indirect purchaser doctrine applies—the
inclination to read statutes narrowly regarding extraterritoriality, as
evidenced in the decision as well as the guidelines from the ABA,
encourage definitions that limit foreign injuries to enter U.S. courts.
For example, the ABA, in a request for clarification regarding the
Proposed Update of the Antitrust Guidelines published by the DOJ,
suggested that the proposed update “implies that cases involving
component price-fixing do not necessarily involve ‘import commerce.’”244
In its request, the ABA urged the DOJ to make this statement explicitly
and to openly adopt the Motorola decision on the issue of “import
commerce” for component price-fixing, but it did not.245

of their prolific foreign subsidiaries if Motorola had its way”). The court noted other
companies and the number of subsidiaries to illustrate: General Motors had twentysix subsidiaries, Walmart had twenty-seven, and Exxon had 122. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. (quoting Connolly, supra note 2). Some believe that the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Motorola “suggest[s] an underlying assumption that criminal prosecution
and fines here and abroad are sufficient to deter global cartel conduct,” but others
resist the idea that the DOJ can successfully do so given that “global cartels have been
highly profitable, and criminal fines, when issued at all, are small in comparison to
profits earned by members of global cartels.” Meriwether, supra note 41, at 14. The
DOJ, however, “seems confident that effective governmental remedies remain [and]
the Department was successful in its criminal prosecution against AU Optronics.”
Motorola, 775 F.3d at 826.
242. Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 15, at 23; see 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2012).
243. Richard J. Link, Annotation, Construction and Application of Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6a, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 483 (Supp. 2018) (citing
Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China MinMetals Corp., 34 F. Supp. 3d 465 (D.N.J. 2014).
244. Joint Comments, supra note 51, at 10.
245. Id.
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Lastly, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on limiting the scope of U.S.
law supports the application of the indirect purchaser doctrine to
American antitrust law, and the ABA agrees. Acknowledging that the
DOJ has pushed for an exception to the doctrine, the ABA states that
an exception to the doctrine would go against “long-standing”
precedent and the principle of international comity; thus, there
should not be an exception for businesses that make the choice to do
business abroad.246
VI. FUTURE OF ANTITRUST CLAIMS UNDER THE FTAIA
Taking the decision in RJR Nabisco as instructive on the
extraterritoriality of antitrust claims under the Sherman Act and
FTAIA, courts can bring FTAIA claims in-line with each other to create
greater uniformity. No recent antitrust cases have cited to the RJR
Nabisco decision; however, consideration of the typical scenario similar
to those in Motorola and Hsiung can be used to illustrate how the issue
should be analyzed consistent with current Supreme Court precedent
and the extraterritoriality doctrine.
Take the following scenario: Companies A, B, and C conspire to fix
the price of component X. Company B sells component X to Company
D, a foreign subsidiary of Company E, which produces the final product
incorporating component X. Company D then sells the final product
to Company E. Company E is a U.S. retailer that receives the final
product and sells it to consumers. The question is whether Company D
can bring a claim on its own behalf and/or through Company E
claiming conspiracy on behalf of its foreign subsidiary, Company D.
Following the reasoning of RJR Nabisco and consistent with Motorola,
the court should acknowledge and analyze the substantive and private
claims separately to decide whether there is a claim in the first place,
and then, whether Company D—or Company D on behalf of Company
E—can bring the claim. The specific facts of the case would determine
whether there is a substantive claim based on a “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce.247 Secondly, if
Company E is trying to bring the claim for itself based on the
downstream increase in the price paid for the final product,
application of the indirect purchaser doctrine would bar the claim.
Because Company E purchased the final product with the
incorporated component from Company D, who bought it from
246. Id. at 8.
247. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3)(A) (2012).
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conspirators (Companies A, B, and C), Company E is the indirect
purchaser of a component that went through at least two layers of the
supply chain. Lastly, if Company E is bringing the claim on behalf of
Company D, its foreign subsidiary, the FTAIA would bar the claim
because it does not fall within the “gives rise to” exception.248 U.S. law
separates the entities into two distinct legal entities, and therefore,
Company E cannot bring a claim for the injury Company D suffered in
foreign commerce. Company D was harmed by the increase in price
for component X prior to Company E selling the final product in the
United States, so such effect on the U.S. domestic commerce does not
“give rise to” Company D’s claim; Company D will have to seek redress
in the country where it is incorporated.249
As the Motorola court noted, while there may be no right to a private
claim, the DOJ would not be precluded from bringing a claim against
Companies A, B, and C for direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effects on the domestic commerce of the United States. If
the DOJ could make such showing, it could hold the conspirators
criminally liable as it did successfully in Hsiung.
CONCLUSION
Current law cautions against the extraterritorial application of
federal statutes as reflected in the recent Supreme Court decision, RJR
Nabisco, which is instructive on the extraterritoriality and scope of other
federal laws, including U.S. antitrust laws. To bring jurisprudence inline with this reasoning, courts should look to the decision in Motorola
when deciding whether the arm of antitrust law extends to reach certain
foreign injuries from component cartel price-fixing schemes.
In making the analogy to antitrust law, the Court stressed that the
analysis of extraterritoriality applies to all federal statutes and
therefore, determining the scope of one law (RICO) will be relevant
to the scope of another (FTAIA). Courts must look to the same twostep analysis outlined in RJR Nabisco, to determine the statute’s reach
when the claim is a private right of action by a foreign plaintiff for
recovery from foreign injury. To do otherwise would be against current
extraterritoriality doctrine, which advises the “reigning in” of foreign
application of U.S. laws out of a concern for international comity.250

248. Id. § 6a(2).
249. Id.
250. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 166–67 (2004).
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Not only is the analogy relevant, but making such comparison is
consistent with statutory construction and legislative history. The
presumption against extraterritoriality is a principle that applies to all
federal statutes and must be applied to each separate provision of a
statute, both the substantive provisions and right of action provisions.
Determining whether the presumption is rebutted first establishes
whether an action exists, and second whether or not the specific
plaintiff has standing to bring that action. Further, the legislative history
behind the enactment of the FTAIA is consistent with the narrowing
trend the Court expressed in RJR Nabisco and incorporating that
rationale would uphold Congress’s intention to clarify, and likely limit,
the scope of the Sherman Act given the concerns raised about its reach.
Looking to recent jurisprudence, the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretations in Motorola are most in accord with the reasoning of the
Supreme Court, and courts should use it as a guide in future antitrust
cases involving foreign component cartels. The Seventh Circuit
reflects the same limiting mindset due to concerns of international
friction as expressed by the Court. The Seventh Circuit in Motorola also
began to discuss the separation of the substantive provision from the
right of action provision in the FTAIA in relation to rebutting the
presumption against extraterritoriality. The presumption is likely
rebutted on the substantive provision if the effect meets the “direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable”251 requirement; however, the
absent a domestic injury, the effect will not give rise to the plaintiff’s
claim, barring recovery. As the court points out, the DOJ may still hold
foreign conspirators accountable because a criminal claim by the
government will meet the “gives rise to” requirement252 claiming injury
to the United States and its commerce.
Lastly, policy considerations support the narrow scope of U.S.
antitrust laws as suggested by the Supreme Court and the Seventh
Circuit. Foreign nations have raised valuable concerns that allowing
foreign plaintiffs to recover under U.S. law allows them to bypass the
laws of the country under which they are incorporated. For those who
feel a globalized society calls for the extension of such reach, it is
important to bear in mind that the United States cannot and should
not police the world. It is simply the price of doing business: if a
company choses to conduct its business in foreign countries or with
foreign enterprises, it must seek redress under such laws. To allow
251. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3)(A).
252. Id. § 6a(2).
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claims like Motorola’s would open the floodgates to domestic
companies bringing private claims on behalf of the thousands of
foreign subsidiaries owned by U.S. companies.
While many issues are left to be resolved, using the RJR Nabisco
decision and its general limiting nature as instructive, courts can
provide be more uniform rulings on the applicability of the FTAIA and
antitrust laws to foreign component cartel cases in the future—an issue
of high importance and one courts are sure to continue to see in the
current, globalized economy.

